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INTRODUCTION

Individuals flee their countries for many reasons. War, famine,
and persecution, however, rank among the most compelling. In today's
world, tremendous socio-economic and political changes necessitate
the migration of individuals across sovereign borders.' An estimated
16 million people worldwide have fled their homelands due to fear of
2
persecution on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs.
Labeled refugees, these persecuted individuals often settle in the

1. See Fiscal Year 1998 Refugee Admissions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1992)
[hereinafter Hearings](statement of Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State, Department of State). The end of the Cold War has brought new problems in certain parts of the
world. For example, in Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia-Hercegovina former state-sponsored
tyranny has been replaced by long-simmering ethnic and religious hatred. Id. Closer to home,
since the September 1991 coup in Haiti, thousands of Haitians have been intercepted by the
United States Coast Guard in waters off the Florida and Haitian coasts. Id.
2. Id.
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United States.3 As a result, the United States has experienced an
4
explosion in the number of asylum applications filed.
The United States has attempted to accommodate those individuals
seeking asylum within its borders. 5 The Refugee Act of 1980 (the
Refugee Act)6 expanded the legal definition of "refugee" to include
individuals fleeing "persecution on account of ...race, religion, nation-

ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
... -7Of these five classifications, asylum applicants most frequently
invoke the Act's "political opinion" language in order to substantiate
a claim."
Because the "political opinion" language is most frequently invoked,
this note focuses on that aspect of the Refugee Act. The note begins
by surveying the evolution of the Act's "political opinion" language in
both the legislature and judiciary. Following that a discussion and
analysis of the most recent interpretation of "political opinion" provided
by the Supreme Court of the United States in INS v. Elias-Zacarias.s
The note then points out weaknesses in the United States' political
asylum process, with suggestions for corrective measures based on
Germany's system. Finally, given the recent changes in the law, this
note concludes with proposed methods aimed at helping practitioners
in the preparation and filing of asylum claims.

3.

See Peter Brimelow, Time to Rethink Immigration, NAT'L REV., June 22, 1992, at 30.
Annual legal immigration of some 950,000 - counting the 140,000 refugees and
the 100,000 granted political asylum - is overwhelmed by the 2 to 3 million illegal
entries into the country every year, which result in a net annual increase of perhaps
250,000 illegal aliens. (A cautious estimate - again, no one really knows.)

Id.
4. Hearings, supra note 1, at 23 (statement of Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary
of State, Department of State).
5. Id. In fiscal year 1993, the Bush Administration proposed funding the admission of
122,000 refugees - a reduction of 10,000 from the current fiscal year. Id. The 122,000 admission
numbers are to be divided as follows: East Asia (including Amerasian immigrants) - 52,000;
Former Soviet Union - 50,000; Near East/South Asia - 7,000; Africa - 7,000; East Europe
- 1,500; and Latin America/Caribbean - 3,500. Id. An additional unallocated reserve of 1,000
admissions could be used where current allocated numbers prove to be insufficient. Id.
6. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
7. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
8. Address by Merrill Smith, Attorney at Law, University of Florida College of Law Haitian
Refugee Immigration Seminar (Oct. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Smith Address].
9. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
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II.

EVOLUTION OF "POLITICAL OPINION"

A.

Legislative History

Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 10 empowers
the United States Attorney General" to grant asylum to aliens who
meet the Act's definition of "refugee": an alien unable or unwilling to
return to his home country "because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of ...political opinion. "12 This definition
originates from the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees. '3 Although the United States never signed the Convention, many of its terms were incorporated into the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,14 a treaty to which the
United States acceded in 1969.15 Eleven years later, through the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress incorporated United States obligations
under the Protocol into domestic law;' 6 consequently, the Protocol's
definition of "refugee" was adopted with little alteration."
That Congress made no attempt at defining "political opinion" or
other terms within the new definition of refugee comes as no surprise.
Congress simply adopted the language of the Convention and its predecessor, the Protocol, neither making substantive changes nor providing definitional guidance.' s Thus, interpreting the precise meaning of

10. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
11. Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a),
allows the Attorney General to decide whether a refugee is eventually granted asylum: "[T]he
alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General
determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section l101(a)(42)(A) of this title."
12. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
13. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
14. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter Protocol].
15. Id.
16. Even though the Protocol is part of 'the supreme Law of the Land," see U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl.2, its provisions do not contain direct grants of rights. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 428 n.22 (1984) (interpreting terms of Convention's Article 34 - incorporated by reference
in Article I of the Protocol - as "precatory").
17. Congress made only minor changes in the definition's grammatical construction. See
Protocol, supra note 14.
18. The Refugee Act's legislative history contains no clarification of the term "political
opinion." See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (finding that Congress
primarily intended to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees - not to alter or abridge the language of
the Refugee Act).
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"political opinion" - whose "political opinion," and what constitutes
persecution because of it - now rests with the judiciary.
B.

Judicial Interpretation

United States courts have, in two recent decisions, reviewed the
"political opinion" language of the Refugee Act. In Bolanos-Hernandez
v. INS, 19 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
examined, inter alia, whether an alien's choice of remaining politically
neutral constitutes the expression of a "political opinion." 20 In BolanosHernandez, petitioner consciously chose not to join either of two warring political factions in his native El Salvador.2 Although petitioner
argued that remaining neutral endangered his life, 22 both the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied petitioner's
application for withholding deportation. 2 Petitioner subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 24
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board of Immigration
Appeals, holding that taking a neutral position constitutes having a
'political opinion."- The Court reasoned by analogy that just as a
nation's choice to remain neutral in times of war is political, so too is
an individual's. 26 Moreover, the Court observed that restricting the
benefits of United States immigration laws to individuals who join one
political extreme or another would frustrate one of the basic tenets
of the Refugee Act-to provide protection to persecuted victims regardless of ideology. 27

19. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
20. Id. at 1285. The court also examined circumstances under which specific threats are
sufficient to constitute a threat of persecution if such threats are representative of a general
level of violence in a foreign country. Id. at 1286.
21. Id. at 1280.
22. Id. Specifically, because of petitioner's involvement in a government operated anti-terrorist police squad, he feared that the terrorist group opposing the government would find his
experience useful and thus attempt conscription. Id. Furthermore, petitioner feared persecution
from his own government based on his brother's membership in an anti-government group. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1277-78.
25. Id. at 1286-88. The court found nothing in the record to support the government's
contention that petitioners decision to remain politically neutral was not a "political choice." Id.
26. Id. at 1286; see Neutrality Act of 1939, 22 U.S.C. §§ 441-465 (1982).
27. Id. at 1286; see S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 142, 144; H.R. REP. No. 96-608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979); Refugee
Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and
InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1979)
(testimony of Griffin Bell, United States Attorney General).
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In another case, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,? the Supreme Court of
the United States examined what standard of proof constitutes a "wellfounded fear of persecution" under the Refugee Act.2 In CardozaFonseca, respondent, a Nicaraguan citizen, requested asylum based
on evidence that she would be tortured for her political beliefs if forced
to return to Nicaragua2 ° In spite of respondent's testimony, the Immigration Judge held that she had not established a "clear probability
of persecution" and, therefore, was not entitled to relief. 31 While the
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed,32 the Ninth Circuit reversed,a
holding that the standard governing asylum proceedings is for the
alien to prove either past persecution or "good reason" to fear future
persecution-' In order to resolve which standard of proof governs
asylum proceedings, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court affirmed and held, inter alia, that an alien need not
demonstrate that a situation will "probably result in persecution," but
only that persecution is a "reasonable possibility."' The Court relied

28. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
29. Id. at 425. Specifically, the Court considered whether § 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (requiring that 'the Attorney General withhold deportation of an alien who
demonstrates that his 'life or freedom would be threatened'), or § 208(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (authorizing the Attorney General, at his discretion, "to grant asylum to
a [refugee] . . . unable or unwilling to return to his home country 'because of persecution or a
well founded fear [thereof on account of particular factors]') should govern asylum applications.

Id. at 423.
30. Id. at 424-25. Moreover, because respondent had fled Nicaragua with her brother previously tortured and imprisoned because of his own political beliefs in Nicaragua - she
feared that she also would be interrogated about his whereabouts. Id.
31. 480 U.S. at 425. Differences have arisen over the precise definition of the "well-founded
fear" standard. Id. at 451; see, e.g., Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1986)
("What is relevant is the fear a reasonable person would have, keeping in mind the context of
a reasonable person who is facing the possibility of persecution, perhaps including a loss of
freedom or even, in some cases, the loss of life."); Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249
(5th Cir. 1986) ("An alien possesses a well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable person
in her circumstances would fear persecution if she were to be returned to her native country.").
32. 480 U.S. at 425.
33. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
34. Id. at 1453 (interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act's "well-founded" fear
standard to require that asylum applicants present "specific facts" through objective evidence
to prove either past persecution or "good reason" to fear future persecution) (quoting CarvajalMunoz v. INS, 742 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)).
35. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
36. 480 U.S. at 440 ("[S]o long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it
need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but is enough that
persecution is a reasonable possibility.") (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984)).
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on its interpretation of the Refugee Act, reasoning that the applicable
standard intended by Congress is a question of pure statutory construction for the courts to decide.37 Interestingly, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment rather than joining the Court's opinion.s Justice
Scalia, writing that the Refugee Act's language is clear and should
therefore be given effect, admonished the Court for "reconstruct[ing]
legislators' intentions. ' 's9 Furthermore, Justice Scalia emphasized that,
when interpreting statutes, courts must defer to the reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency"4 - an approach
not followed in Cardoza-Fonsecabut closely adhered to by the Court
41 a decision rendered in January of 1992.
in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
C.

Recent Changes

In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,respondent fled Guatemala when two
uniformed guerrillas carrying machine guns attempted to recruit him
into an anti-government organization. 42 When respondent arrived in
the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
apprehended him for entering the country without inspection. 43 At the
deportation hearing,- the immigration judge denied Zacarias' application for asylum," rejecting the argument that his fear of persecution

37. Id. at 445-48.
38. Id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[C]ourts must give effect to a reasonable agency
interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is inconsistent with a clearly expressed
congressional intent.") (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
41. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
42. Id. at 814. Respondent testified that "[T]he guerrillas asked his parents and himself to
join with them, but they all refused. The guerrillas asked them why and told them that they
would be back, and that they should think it over about joining them." Id.
43. Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990).
44. Id. Respondent "conceded deportability and applied for asylum and withholding of deportation." Id.
45. Id. The record before the Immigration Judge at the hearing included respondent's
testimony and an advisory letter from the State Department concerning his application. Id. In
relevant part the letter stated:
The applicant alleges fear of persecution because of civil conflict that afflicts parts
of Guatemala and has caused various hardships and dangers, including forced recruitment by opposing armed forces. . . . Persons who flee their homelands due
to national armed conflicts in which they are random victims of violence, intimidation, or recruitment are not generally classifiable as refugees under U.S. law.
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on account of "political opinion" entitled 46 him to a grant of asylum 47
under the Refugee Act.4 The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed
the immigration judge's determination.49 In reversing that determination,5° the Ninth Circuit ruled that a guerilla organization's acts of
conscription constitute persecution on account of "political opinion,"
and that Zacarias had a well-founded fear of such persecution. 51 On
certiorari, the Court reversed and held that a guerrilla organization's
attempts at forced recruitment do not necessarily constitute persecu52
tion on account of "political opinion" under the Refugee Act.
The Elias-Zacarias Court,5 3 in interpreting the Refugee Act, found
that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "persecution on account of
. . . political opinion" means "persecution on account of the victim's
political opinion, not the persecutor's. ' ' Accordingly, victims of political persecution must provide some evidence of their fear of persecution, either direct or circumstantial.- Because respondent did not pro-

46. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
47. Two code sections take effect when an alien petitions for relief from deportation. Section
208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988), provides for asylum for political
refugees, while § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by § 203(e) of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988), prohibits the Attorney General from deporting
an alien whose life or freedom would be endangered.
48. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). The Act also provides for grants
of asylum because of "[p]ersecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, [or] membership in a particular social group. . . ." Id.
49. Elias-Zacarias,921 F.2d at 847. The Board of Immigration Appeals summarily dismissed respondent's appeal on procedural grounds. Id. Respondent then requested that the Board
reopen his deportation hearing so he could submit new evidence; namely, that subsequent to
his fleeing Guatemala, the guerrillas had returned to his family's home twice in order to recruit
him. Id. at 852-53. The Board, however, denied the request, reasoning that despite the new
evidence respondent had failed to make a prima facia showing of eligibility for asylum and had
failed to show that the results of his deportation hearing would be changed. Id. at 854 n.13.
50. Id. at 855. Although respondent petitioned for review of the denial of his application
for political asylum and withholding of deportation, the court only granted review of the former.
Id. at 846-47.
51. Id. at 847-52.
52. 112 S. Ct. 812, 814-17 (1992).
53. Id. at 812. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J.,
and White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, J.J., joined. Id. at 814.
54. Id. at 816. The Court reasoned "[i]f a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is not, within
the ordinary meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of political opinion; and
if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it is not engaging in persecution on
account of religion." Id.
55. Id. at 816-17. The Court asserted that "[tihe mere existence of a generalized 'political'
motive underlying the guerrillas' forced recruitment" failed to establish respondent's fear of
persecution based on "political opinion." Id. at 816.
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vide such evidence, the Court concluded that he should not be entitled
to withholding of deportation or granting of asylum. 56
The Elias-ZacariasCourt also concluded, contrary to the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Bolanos-Hernandez,57 that respondent's position
of neutrality ordinarily does not constitute the expression of a "political
opinion. '" For this conclusion, however, the Elias-Zacariascourt offered no explanation.59 Rather, it asserted that even if Zacarias' neutral
position expressed a "political opinion," he still did not prove a "wellfounded" fear of persecution because of itA0
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens strongly contested the
majority's findings. Stevens maintained, as did the Ninth Circuit Court
in Bolanos-Hernandez,61 that the refusal to support a cause can be
expressed "negatively as well as affirmatively. ' ' 62 Respondent's refusal
to join the guerrilla force, reasoned Stevens, expressed a "political
opinion" under the Refugee Act, entitling respondent to a grant of
asylum. 63 The dissent further reprimanded the majority for its "grudging construction" of "political opinion." 64 Justice Stevens emphasized
that, under Cardoza-Fonseca, an asylum applicant need only show a
"reasonable possibility" of persecution because of his "political opinion," not the more stringent standard implied by the majority.6
III.

"POLITICAL OPINION" IN THE

90's

A. Ramifications of Elias-Zacarias
Under the Supreme Court's most recent decision, refugees fleeing
forced recruitment are less likely to receive grants of asylum on

56. Id. at 817. The standard for obtaining judicial reversal of the Board of Immigration
Appeal's determination is for respondent to show that his evidence presented "was so compelling
that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution." Id.
57. 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
58. 112 S. Ct. at 816. The Court disagreed with the dissent that only a "narrow, grudging
construction of the concept of 'political opinion,'... would distinguish it from such quite different
concepts as indifference, indecisiveness and risk-averseness." Id.
59. Id. at 818-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 820 n.7.
61. See supra notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text.
62. 112 S. Ct. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 819 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Stevens asserted that any
doubts concerning the horrible nature of "a suggestion to 'think it over' delivered by two
uniformed masked men carrying machine guns should be resolved in respondent's favor." Id.
at 820 n.7 (Stevens,--J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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grounds of political persecution. By not following the "reasonable possibility" standard set out in Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court implicitly
increases the amount of proof needed to demonstrate a "well-founded
fear of persecution" under the Refugee Act.- Thus, individuals seeking
haven in the United States must now more thoroughly articulate their
political opinions as well as the political motivations of their persecutors.6 7 This ultimately puts thousands of aliens at risk because, before fleeing forced recruitment, they must express a clear statement
of their political views to their persecutors.r Aliens fleeing forced
recruitment, therefore, face completely new issues of proof under the
Refugee Act, making the asylum process more complex and grants of
69
asylum less frequent.
The decision also forces appellate courts to meet a more stringent
standard of review before reversing decisions by immigration agencies.
While the decision in Elias-Zacariasturned mainly upon the construction of the Refugee Act, Justice Scalia asserted, as he did in his
concurring opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, that an administrative
agency's determination must be upheld if supported by the record. 70
Therefore, appellate courts will likely pay greater deference to immigration agencies' determinations before entering orders of reversal.
In addition to raising the standard of proof that asylum applicants
must meet under Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court's interpretation of the
Refugee Act provides an effective means of skirting the constraints
of Bolanos-Hernandez'sneutrality analysis.71 Under the interpretation
- that persecution because of "political opinion" means persecution
on account of the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's - the
Elias-ZacariasCourt never had to consider whether respondent's po-

66. Prior to the decision, the Cardoza-FonsecaCourt established that when a "reasonable
possibility" of persecution confronted an asylum applicant, such evidence sufficiently invoked
the protection of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 818-19 (Stevens, J. dissenting);
see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
67. 112 S. Ct. at 817 ("But since the statute makes motive critical, he [respondent] must
provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial.") (emphasis in original).
68. See id. Furthermore, in some third world countries the political views of persecutor
and victim are often blurred by a myriad of competing ideologies.
69. See T. David Parish, Membership in a ParticularSocial Group Under the Refugee Act
of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 933
(1992).
70. 112 S. Ct. at 815; see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
71. 112 S. Ct. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1985) where the Court of Appeals found that "[c]hoosing to remain neutral is no
less a political decision than is choosing to affiliate with a particular political faction").
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sition of neutrality constituted a "political opinion."72 Rather, the Court
simply determined that even if neutrality does express a "political
opinion," respondent did not fear persecution because of it.73 Thus,
the Court quashes the Ninth Circuit's analysis supporting neutrality
as a means of political expression.
Most importantly, the Court's legal analysis would produce exactly
the same result if respondent had thoroughly articulated his political
views and the political views of his persecutors.7 4 By concluding that
respondent did not fear persecution because of his own "political opinion," the expression of that opinion - whether articulate or ambiguous
- becomes meaningless. Similarly, any evidence demonstrating the
motives of respondent's persecutors would also be inconsequential;
respondent still would not possess the requisite fear of persecution on
account of his own "political opinion. 7 5 Thus, the Court's construction
of the Refugee Act produces inherent flaws in its legal analysis, and
ultimately prevents those articulating their fears of political persecution from receiving grants of asylum.
B.

The German Political Asylum Process:
Lessons for the United States

While the legislative history and judicial interpretation of "political
opinion" have directly and adversely affected refugees' chances of receiving asylum grants, problems in the asylum process, itself, also
have been a contributing factor. In order to evaluate those systemic
problems, this portion of the note compares Germany's political asylum
process with that of the United States'. Germany serves as an excellent
country to compare with the United States because, like the United
States, Germany's generous asylum policies, its high standards of living, its limits on legal immigration, and world events have caused a
dramatic increase in the number of asylum claims. This note will
compare the two systems by discussing the deterance of the filing of
new claims and the expediting of the adjudication of claims.
1. Deterring the Filing of New Claims
The foundation of the American political asylum process is grounded
in a legal and moral obligation not to return individuals to countries

72. Id. at 816 (majority opinion) ("But we need not decide whether the evidence compels
the conclusion that Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion.").
73. Id.
74. Id. at 820 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
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in which there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be persecuted.76
The United States has, in recent years, focused on two specific immigration goals: deterring the filing of new claims and expediting the
adjudication of claims.- While the German government has moved
vigorously on both fronts, the United States has primarily concentrated on programs designed to deter the filing of new claims.78
Deterring the filing of new claims presents several problems. One
problem is that refugees with bona fide claims may be deterred or
prevented from applying and may be returned to face political persecution. 79 Clearly, the challenge is to develop a set of policies that
deters frivolous claims while allowing bona fide claims to come through.
Another obvious problem is the lack of information concerning the
motivations and actions of asylum seekers.80 Not knowing what motivates an asylum seeker creates serious difficulty in formulating a sound
policy of deterrence.
This difficulty is most pronounced in the Haitian interdiction program,8 1 started in the Reagan years and continued during the Bush
Administration. Under the program, an American Coast Guard ship
patrols the shores of Haiti, boarding vessels and returning refugees
wanting to enter the United States illegally.- The policy's purpose is

76. See Hearings, supra note 1.
77. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, PoliticalAsylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Republic of France:Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183, 226 (1984).
78. Id.; see also John Eisenhammer, Bonn Shifts to Right on Asylum Law, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 15, 1992, at 12. Recently, the German Government has also considered amending
its constitution to toughen the asylum law. Id. The unprecedented influx of foreigners and the
growth of intolerance and racist violence have provoked a strong rightward shift by all the main
parties. Id.
79. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 230. Naturally, applicants with bona fide claims deterred
from filing in the United States may be able to find refuge elsewhere, or they may enter the
country illegally. Id. at n.158.
80. Id. at 230.
81. An estimated 38,000 Haitians have been intercepted since a coup overthrowing the
democratically elected government of Haitian President Bertrand Aristide on September 30,
1991, left the island devastated by violence and political turmoil. See Sharon LaFraniere, Justice
Department Appeals Court Order on Haitian Policy; High Court Asked to Overturn Ban on
Returning Refugees, WASH. POST, July 31, 1992, at A2.
82. See Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State, Department of State).
83. Id. On May 24, 1992, President Bush issued an executive order which instructed the
United States Coast Guard to return interdicted Haitians directly to Haiti, where refugee
processing is available. Id. After the September 1991 coup in Haiti, and especially during the
summer of 1992, the number of Haitians intercepted by the Coast Guard increased dramatically.
Id. The President issued the executive order only after the asylum pre-screening facility at

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

11

Florida Journal
of International Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 6

undoubtedly to prevent aliens from reaching Florida, where they can
secure legal advice and file asylum claims.8 While the policy has effectively stopped the flow of aliens into the United States, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has found that it
violates the Refugee Act.- Specifically, the court ordered an immediate injunction against the return of an alien "whose life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his . . . political opinion. "
Moreover, the court stated that the Bush policy runs counter "to
Congress' plainly expressed intent."87
Because the Second Circuit's opinion flatly contradicts the Eleventh
Circuit's ruling in Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, in which the
Eleventh Circuit found that the Protocol provided no rights to Haitian
asylum-seekers beyond United States territory,- the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari.89 The Justice Department, consistent with the
holding in Baker, is arguing that the Refugee Act does not apply to
refugees who have not yet reached United States territory.9° Thus,
under the current policy, an alien fleeing persecution on account of
"political opinion" is not only refused the protection of United States
immigration laws, but also prevented from seeking safe haven anywhere. 91 In sum, a respectable and humane policy of deterrence has
not been, and without much better information cannot be, achieved. 2
Returning to the comparison with Germany, one must determine
if the United States could do better by adopting the German deterrent
policies.9 Unfortunately, it seems not. The United States already has
two of the German policies in place: aliens need visas to enter the
United States, and work authorization is granted only for asylum
applicants with "non-frivolous" claims.Y Furthermore, given a porous
border and large demand for low-wage, undocumented workers,

Guantanamo Bay in Cuba became flooded, and INS officials were unable to locate additional
screening locations. Id.
84. See id.
85. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 1367-68; LaFraniere, supra note 81.
87. LaFraniere, supra note 81; McNary, 969 F.2d at 1359.
88. 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991).
89. McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
90. See LaFraniere, supra note 81.
91. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 232.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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neither policy effectively deters illegal entry.9 5 Thus, deterring the
filing of claims must be accomplished by different methods. One possible method of deterrence is improved border control coupled with
detaining aliens with patently frivolous claims at the border. The second possible method is expediting the adjudication of asylum claims.
2.

Expediting the Adjudication of Claims

Expediting the adjudication of claims would diminish incentives for
an alien to file a claim for the sole purpose of forestalling deportation.
In their home countries, would-be migrants would see aliens who filed
frivolous claims returning home after only a brief stay in the United
States. Furthermore, expediting the adjudication of claims would restore faith that the United States Government is not using the immigration system to serve its political agenda. The German political
asylum system provides three possibilities for reform. The first possibility is the establishment of an independent federal agency to adjudicate asylum claims.a.

Establishing an Independent Federal Agency to Adjudicate Claims

In the United States, an alien may apply for asylum to an INS
official or an immigration judge.- Only a fraction of these officials'
duties, however, may involve the adjudication of asylum claims.- Furthermore, only a small percentage of INS officials and immigration
judges have specialized training in asylum matters or international
law;- they rely instead upon advice from the State Department.Thus, the State Department has the opportunity to influence asylum
claims with political considerations, leaving otherwise bona fide claims
meritless in the eyes of officials.101
By contrast, the German system for adjudicating claims involves
a centralized federal agency.- ° The only purpose for the agency is to

95. Id.
96. Id. at 234. Currently two federal agencies are solely adjudicatory bodies: the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976), and the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission, 30 U.S.C. § 823 (Supp. V 1981). Aleinikoff, supra note
77, at 232 n.167.
97. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 234.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see, e.g., Elias-Zacarias,921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990) (involving State Department opinion letter supporting BIA's determination that respondent should be deported).
101. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 234.
102. Id.
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adjudicate asylum claims."° Moreover, the agency fosters the development of expertise and knowledge, the uniform application of the law,
and much less reliance on the foreign ministries for guidance and
information.'- Thus, decision-makers can become experts on certain
countries, getting thoroughly acquainted with events, political parties,
and social conditions in those countries. 1°5 Moreover, decision-makers
can use their expertise to better judge an asylum applicant's credibil°
ity."0
b.

Limiting the Advisory Role of the State Department

The second possibility for reform in the United States political
asylum process is limiting the advisory role of the State Department.1
In the United States, INS officials and immigration judges rely heavily
on State Department opinion letters before adjudicating asylum
claims. a0 In fact, the State Department's Bureau on Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs issues an opinion letter on each asylum
claim.' ° The letter must first be cleared with the appropriate country
desk in the State Department."10 Thus, the State Department can,
and frequently does, advance its own political agenda through opinion
letters."' This situation was most evident during the 1980's and 1990's,
as Eastern Europeans and Cubans were granted asylum with relative
ease while Haitians and Salvadorans faced deportation even before
entering the United States.
By contrast, the German Government's independent centralized
immigration agency relies very little on information from its equivalent
to the State Department. 1 2 The centralized nature of the immigration
agency has allowed sufficient expertise to develop, rendering reliance
on outside sources for information unnecessary. "1 In fact, officials in
the German immigration agency openly acknowledge the inherent

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105.

Id.

106. Id.; cf. Smith Address, supra note 8 (explaining that establishing an asylum applicant's
credibility - in the eyes of an immigration official - is perhaps the most important aspect of
winning an asylum claim for the client).
107. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 235.
108. Id. at 234.
109. Id. at 236.
110. Id.
111.

Id.

112.
113.

Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 236.
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problems associated with gathering information from what may be a
14
politically-motivated source.'
Although the State Department's influence on the asylum process
should be curtailed, it need not be eliminated altogether. Ideally, the
Department's opinion letter would be one of many sources of information used in adjudicating an asylum claim. In addition to the letter,
an INS official or immigration judge could look to Amnesty International, newspapers, expert witnesses, and academics for information.
Furthermore, immigration lawyers are increasingly using information
from their clients to compile data bases on political conditions in the
countries from which refugees have fled. 115 These data bases could
serve as an invaluable resource to an immigration judge or INS official
6
in adjudicating an asylum claim."
c. Limiting Judicial Review
A third, and final, possibility for reform in the political asylum
process is to limit judicial review of INS decisions."17 Currently, the
United States system guarantees a multi-level judicial review process.118 After an immigration judge or INS official makes a determination, that determination may be reviewed by the Board of Immigration
Appeals, the appropriate federal circuit court, the United States Attorney General, and the United States Supreme Court." 9
By contrast, Germany's political asylum process is very streamlined. 2 0 A lower administrative court determines whether an asylum
applicant's claim is "obviously unfounded" or "unfounded. ' 21 If the
claim is "obviously unfounded," there is no further appeal.'2 If the

114.
115.

Id.
Smith Address, supra note 8 ("Vast resources have been compiled from client inter-

views used in putting together asylum claims. We've used this data base to put together other
claims, and we're finding that there is a definite pattern in... the persecution when our clients
come from the same geographic area in Haiti.").
116. Id.
117. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 236. Note, however, that implementing a system that
makes the administrative determination final and unreviewable raises serious constitutional
issues. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (holding that the Constitution did not
prohibit the delegation of adjudicatory power to a non-Article III court).
118. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 236.
119. See, e.g., Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 815.
120. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 210, 236.
121. Id. at 210.
122. Id.; but see Eisenhammer, supra note 78, at 12. In recent weeks Chancellor Helmut
Kohl's governing coalition has made clear that it intends to do away with existing German
Constitution Article 16, which provides that "[p]ersons persecuted on political grounds shall
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claim is "unfounded," the administrative court may authorize an appeal
only if the case raises an important question of law or differs from
higher court decisions.' 23 Thus, Germany's policy of limited opportunities for judicial review has substantially accelerated the adjudica24
tive process for politically persecuted individuals.1
C.

Proposed Methods for Practitioners

Given the current status of the law, immigration lawyers representing politically persecuted individuals must come forward with more
evidence of their clients' fears of persecution. 125 This situation necessitates gathering more substantive information from political refugees
before going to court or to an INS interview.126 Practitioners should
therefore consider researching the past and present political situation
of the country from which an asylum applicant has fled. 127 From that
research, counsel can better prepare an applicant for questioning,
clearly defining the applicant's exact political motives, as well as the
motives of his or her persecutors.12s
In addition to conducting research on an applicant's home country,
a "rehearsed" cassette tape in the client's native tongue is an excellent
preparatory measure. 129 By listening to the tape and rehearsing the
testimony, the client will likely feel more comfortable fielding questions

enjoy the right of asylum." Id. Effectively, the coalition's proposal would eliminate this fundamental guarantee of asylum and thus mandate that all cases of "obviously unfounded" applicants
be summarily dismissed. Id. Consequently, asylum seekers from countries declared free of
political persecution would be deported without a court hearing. Id. The rationale behind the
proposal stems from tremendous ethnic violence toward a record 250,000 foreigners seeking
asylum in Germany. Id. Interestingly, 90% of these individuals are not seeking refuge because
of political persecution; they seek refuge because of poor economic conditions in their homelands.
Id.
123. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 210.
124. Id. at 211.
125. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
126. Smith Address, supra note 8.
127. Although the State Department provides an advisory letter to the Immigration Judge
describing conditions in an alien's native country, the practitioner should ascertain and validate
for himself such conditions. As the lower court in Elias-Zacariaspointed out, although the
State Department provided information about Guatemala in its letter, the State Department
also provided conclusions of law with which respondent disagreed; see Elias-Zacarias,921 F.2d
at 848.
128. Id. at 816-17 (majority opinion). Keep in mind, however, that an articulate statement
of "political opinion" is not enough to qualify for a grant of asylum - the "political opinion"
must also be that of the alien's. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
129. Smith Address, supra note 8.
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from the court. Consequently, the client will appear more credible. 13
Moreover, if the client better understands the testimony in his native
tongue, the specificity and clarity with which it can be translated
further solidifies a claim for asylum.131
Finally, in addition to thoroughly researching and compiling all
evidence relating to an asylum applicant's "political opinion," immigration attorneys should explore other avenues under the Refugee Act
that would allow an alien to remain in the country. While the EliasZacarias Court has rigidly defined the standard of proof for "political
opinion," fear of persecution due to one of the Refugee Act's other
classifications - "race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group" - might also establish an alien's claim for
asylum.132 Thus, practitioners should pay careful attention to which
classifications exist under the Refugee Act, and which classifications
best serve the interest of the asylum applicant.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Individuals seeking political asylum in the United States face new
challenges under the current immigration law. The Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Refugee Act in Elias-Zacariasmakes grants of
asylum more difficult to obtain for those fleeing political persecution.'
Asylum grants are more difficult to obtain because the Court's decision
implicitly increases the amount of proof necessary to demonstrate a
"fear of persecution" under the Refugee Act. The decision also forces
appellate courts to meet a more stringent standard of review before
reversing decisions by immigration agencies.' m
Given the recent judicial interpretation of the Refugee Act, immigration practitioners must change their approach to counseling
clients.- Researching the political situation of an alien's country can
help in defining "political opinion" with specificity. Also, by exploring
classifications under the Refugee Act other than "political opinion,"

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See also Parish, Membership in a ParticularSocial Group under the Refugee Act of
1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 933 (1992)
(developing a principled and consistent standard by which to judge claims of social group status
under the Refugee Act of 1980; because persecution on account of "political opinion" is a common,
identifiable characteristic, those fearing such persecution collectively make up a "social group"
under the Act).
133. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
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such as persecution on account of nationality or race, practitioners can
find alternative means for substantiating an asylum applicant's claim.
On a broader scale, however, problems in the political asylum process also affect asylum grants. While the United States has, for the
past decade, focussed primarily on deterring the filing of new claims,
expediting the adjudication of those claims offers a more promising
answer to the immigration problem.136 Looking abroad, Germany has
recognized the importance of expediting the adjudication of claims. To
this end, Germany has established an independent federal agency the
only purpose of which is to adjudicate asylum claims; limited the advisory role of its counterpart to the State Department, thereby
eliminating the government's political influence from the process; and
limited judicial review, which streamlines the asylum process and prevents refugees from filing frivolous claims merely to stay in the country
for an extended period. If the United States were to adopt all three
of these measures, increased efficiency in the asylum process would
inevitably lead to lower costs to taxpayers. Furthermore, the political
asylum process would be less "political," with limited intervention
from the State Department.
However, these measures would be only a beginning. The United
States must, if it is to remain a world leader in human rights, make
an effort to bring about political and economic stability through bilateral negotiations with neighboring countries. In Germany, even with
the measures discussed above in place, hundreds of thousands of refugees have flooded the immigration system. 137 The country acts as a
magnet for poor immigrants from Eastern Europe and Third Worldcountries.'- As a result of this tremendous influx, far-right extremism,
xenophobic violence, and nationalism have all been on the rise. 3 9 Very

136. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
137. See Sir Leon Brittan, The European Single Market: Implicationsfor Policing, Speech
at the NEWSAM Memorial Lecture (Nov. 1, 1991), in RAPID, Nov. 5, 1991. Because Germany
is part of the European Community (EC), all EC members are closely watching how the German
Government handles the immigration problem. Id. All Community countries, moreover, understand that an immigration problem for Germany is an immigration problem for them as well. Id.
138. Id. Sadly, many economic migrants falsely claim to be victims of political persecution
in their countries of origin. Id. In some Community countries, asylum applicants also obtain a
right to work and to social security during the asylum process. Id. Social and policing problems
aside, the abuse of the asylum procedures will make Community countries less receptive to
genuine political refugees who have always and rightly been welcomed, and who also have clear
rights under the Geneva Convention. Id.
139. Id.
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simply, immigration problems transcend political and socio-economic
boundaries. Immigration problems are the responsibility of the world,
not one country. Thus, because immigration problems originating in
Yugoslavia or Haiti are not just the problems of Germany or of the
United States, we must act together - not as nations, but as a global
society - in order to help the politically persecuted find asylum, and
more importantly, to help them one day return home.
Mark A. Burch
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